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Abstract
Given a large number of low-level heterogeneous cate-
gorical alerts from an anomaly detection system, how
to characterize complex relationships between different
alerts, filter out false positives, and deliver trustwor-
thy rankings and suggestions to end users? This prob-
lem is motivated by and generalized from applications
in enterprise security and attack scenario reconstruc-
tion. While existing techniques focus on either recon-
structing abnormal scenarios or filtering out false posi-
tive alerts, it can be more advantageous to consider the
two perspectives simultaneously in order to improve de-
tection accuracy and better understand anomaly behav-
iors. In this paper, we propose CAR, a collaborative
alerts ranking framework that exploits both temporal
and content correlations from heterogeneous categorical
alerts. CAR first builds a tree-based model to capture
both short-term correlations and long-term dependen-
cies in each alert sequence, which identifies abnormal ac-
tion sequences. Then, an embedding-based model is em-
ployed to learn the content correlations between alerts
via their heterogeneous categorical attributes. Finally,
by incorporating both temporal and content depen-
dencies into one optimization framework, CAR ranks
both alerts and their corresponding alert patterns. Our
experiments — using real-world enterprise monitoring
data and real attacks launched by professional hackers
— show that CAR can accurately identify true positive
alerts and successfully reconstruct attack scenarios at
the same time.
Keywords: anomaly detection, enterprise security
system, alerts ranking, temporal dependency modeling,
content dependency modeling.
1 Introduction
In modern information systems or cyber-physical sys-
tems, such as social networks, enterprise computer net-
works, or data centers, a significant challenge is to un-
derstand the underlying regularity/irregularity of the
vast amount of data that are being generated and col-
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Figure 1: One example of APT attack
lected in a streaming fashion. By identifying underlying
anomalies or irregular patterns, critical actionable in-
formation can be extracted to facilitate human decision
making and mitigate the potential damage.
Towards this end, a variety of anomaly detection
systems (e.g., [3, 9, 12]) have been developed to pro-
vide in-depth protection in various information systems.
However, in order to fully capture the system status and
guarantee sufficient detecting power, a large volume of
alert data often needs to be generated from different
detectors. On the one hand, this poses significant chal-
lenges to end-users in performing effective analysis and
initiating timely response; on the other hand, false pos-
itive alerts (i.e., alarms that were triggered incorrectly
by benign events) can be prevalent, leading to unnec-
essary system intervention or suspensions. Therefore,
it is particularly important to build trustworthy post-
processing systems to reduce false positives from mas-
sive amount of raw alert data, intelligently correlate and
associate alerts from different sources, and uncover in-
terpretable anomaly patterns for understanding the sys-
tem/user’s irregular behaviors.
Building an efficient alerts post-processing system
is quite challenging for several reasons. Firstly, most
anomaly detection systems focus on low-level interac-
tion between system entities and generate isolated alerts
while system/user’s abnormal behaviors are high level
activities consisting of different low-level events/steps.
For example, in an enterprise intrusion detection sys-
tem, a network attack called Advanced Persistent
Threat (APT) as shown in Fig. 1 is composed of a
set of stealthy and continuous computer hacking pro-
cesses, by first attempting to gain a foothold in the
environment, then using the compromised systems as
the access into the target network, followed by deploy-
ing additional tools that help fulfill the attack objec-
tive. Thus, it is hard to infer which process/alerts cor-
respond to attack behaviors by looking them indepen-
dently. Second, the multi-modal and nonlinear corre-
lation between alerts further exacerbates the problem.
Alerts can demonstrate complex inter-relations either in
the temporal domain (temporal correlation) or in terms
of the contents they carry (content correlation). These
contents are often represented by heterogeneous cate-
gorical attributes that defy existing similarity measure-
ments. Meanwhile, temporally correlated alerts may not
occur consecutively but be segmented by false positive
ones. Therefore, it is necessary to develop an advanced
alerts post-processing system that captures both long-
term temporal dependencies and content correlation be-
tween alerts.
Existing works on alerts post-processing focus ei-
ther on modeling causalities between alerts to recon-
struct abnormal scenarios [5, 11, 21], or filtering out
false positive alerts [15, 16, 20]. Due to aforementioned
challenges, it can be more advantageous to consider
both factors in order to improve detection accuracy and
understand complex abnormal patterns. Filtering out
false positive alerts leads to more confident abnormal
scenarios being reconstructed. On the other hand, mod-
eling the dependencies between alerts helps to filter out
isolated alerts as false positives. Moreover, many ex-
isting works rely on users’ prior knowledge or training
data to achieve good performance, which are seldom
available in practical scenarios.
In this paper, we propose CAR, an unsuper-
vised, data-driven collaborative alerts ranking frame-
work that enables one to identify trustworthy alerts and
reconstruct abnormal scenarios simultaneously by ex-
ploiting both temporal and content correlations between
alerts. The proposed method addresses the challenges
in three steps. To model the temporal dependency be-
tween alerts, we design a tree-based model that com-
pactly represents the alert sequence as well as preserves
the long-term temporal dependencies. A set of hierar-
chical Bayesian priors is used to model the dependen-
cies in a probabilistic way. We further discover a set of
alert patterns that correlate individual alerts with in-
cidences of abnormal scenarios. To model the content
correlation between alerts, we propose an embedding-
based model to learn the latent vector of each entity.
Based on the learned embedding vector, a proximity
measurement is adopted to quantify the similarity be-
tween alerts. Finally, to identify the ground truth alerts
and alert patterns corresponding to abnormal behaviors,
we formulate the collaborative alerts ranking as an op-
timization problem by incorporating the temporal and
content structures between alerts.
To summarize, in this paper we make the following
contributions:
• We identify an important problem (collaborative
alerts ranking) in alerts post-processing, and pro-
pose a novel alerts post-processing system that in-
tegrates the false positive reduction and abnormal
scenario reconstruction into one framework.
• We exploit both temporal and content correlations
between alerts.
• We develop a prefix tree-based temporal model
to discover the underlying abnormal scenarios
by modeling the long-term dependencies between
alerts.
• We build an embedding-based content model to
measure the similarity between heterogeneous cat-
egorical alerts.
• We successfully apply our methodology to a real
enterprise security system and demonstrate its ef-
fectiveness.
2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we introduce some notations and define
the problem. Different to traditional anomaly detection
methods that focus on numerical data, our goal is to
build an unsupervised and data-driven alerts post pro-
cessing system for heterogeneous categorical alert data,
where there is less existing work and more challenging.
Heterogeneous Categorical Alert. A heterogeneous
categorical alert a = (v1, . . . , vm, t), detected by an
anomaly detection system/sensor, is a suspicious event
record that contains m different categorical attributes,
and the ith attribute value vi denotes an entity from
the type Vi. Only the time entity t is with continuous
value, but it can be chunked into segments of different
granularities, such as day and hour, which then can be
viewed as categorical entity. In the enterprise security
system, an alert is a record involving entities of types
such as the user, time, source/destination process and
files. In the following, we will call it alert for short.
Alert Pattern. An alert pattern is a subsequence of
alerts that may represent the multiple steps/phases of
an abnormal behavior. An alert pattern of length L is
constructed by L alerts, denoted as u1:L = {a1, . . . , aL},
ordered by their occurring times, T (a1) < · · · < T (aL).
In this paper, we focus on identifying the alerts
and alert patterns that are most likely to indicate the
abnormal behaviors.
Problem Statement. Given a set of heterogeneous
categorical alerts generated by the same anomaly de-
tection system (with one or multiple detectors deployed)
until time T , {a1, . . . , aT }, the maximum length of an
alert pattern Lmax, and an integer number K, the prob-
lem is how to efficiently and effectively find the top K
ranked alerts that are most likely to be true positives
and the corresponding alert patterns with length less
than or equal to Lmax.
3 Methodology
Intuitively, our method is based on the key observation
that the isolated alerts may seldom be true positives,
while the alerts whose occurrence can be favorably sup-
ported by others, both temporally and contextually, are
more likely to be important and true positive alerts.
Thus, our goal is to provide a framework for automatic
exploration of both temporal and content-based depen-
dency between alerts and identification of the trustwor-
thy alerts and their corresponding abnormal patterns.
We start by exploiting the temporal structure in
alert sequences. A tree-based model is built to re-
cover the temporal dependencies between these alerts
and simultaneously extract a set of alert patterns. In
the meantime, we embed the categorical entities into
a latent space to model the content similarities be-
tween the alerts. Based on our assumption that iso-
lated alerts may seldom be true positives, we compute
ranking scores of the alerts by maximizing consensus
among the temporal and content structures, and simul-
taneously reconstruct the abnormal scenarios from the
trustworthy alerts. Detailed description of each step is
presented in the following paragraphs.
3.1 Temporal Dependency Modeling We start
by symbolizing the raw alert sequence under an appro-
priate granularity. Specifically, we will consider only a
set of important entities1, such as the source and desti-
nation information to represent each alert, and enumer-
ate all possible alerts in the symbol set Σ = {si}.
In the literature, random walk [7], Markov
model [21], and n-gram model [2] are popular tech-
niques to characterize temporal dependencies using dis-
tributions of future symbols conditioned on a finite his-
tory of symbols. However, they only capture finite, or
1Please note that other entity information will still be consid-
ered in the content dependency modeling part (see Section 3.2)
short-term dependencies between alerts while a real sys-
tem/user’s abnormal behavior may include a number of
separate steps residing on a long temporal span. To
measure the long-term dependency, we model each alert,
si, using a predictive distribution that is conditional on
all previous alerts, u1:i−1 = {s1 . . . , si−1}. Thus, the
joint distribution of each pattern can be estimated as:
(3.1) p(u1:L) =
L∏
i=1
p(si|u1:i−1)
This is a non-Markovian model since the number of
preceding alerts varies. If the prediction of next alert
only relates to the values of n preceding alerts, the
problem in Equation 3.1 can be approximated by an nth
order Markov model, i.e. P (si|u1:i−1) = P (si|ui−n:i−1).
Denote the predictive distribution conditioned on
preceding alerts u1:i−1 as G[u1:i−1], it can be repre-
sented as a probability vector with latent variables,
i.e., G[u1:i−1](s) = p(si = s|u), ∀s ∈ Σ. To obtain
the joint distribution in Equation 3.1, we need to esti-
mate all distributions with respect to the prefixes of u,
i.e., {G[u′]}u′∈{u1:i|16i6L}. Estimating the probability
vectors independently relies on adequate training ob-
servations that represent the underlying distribution.
However, the abnormal scenarios can be rare in real-
ity, which results in few observations of alert pattern.
This is insufficient for estimating the probability vector.
Thus, we use a prefix tree to represent alert sequence
[19] that hierarchically ties together the predictive prob-
abilities and build a hierarchical Bayesian model to
address the problem of insufficient training data, which
uses observations that occur in very long patterns to re-
cursively inform the estimation of the predictive proba-
bilities for related shorter patterns and vice versa [18].
3.1.1 Model Learning In the prefix tree, each node
represents an alert pattern and its probability vector.
By recursively adding the prefix alert to alert pattern
and marginalizing out the non-brunching interior nodes,
the prefix tree can be directly constructed from an input
sequence in linear time and space [19]. A marginalized
prefix tree built from an example sequence s = ABCBC
is shown in Fig. 2. The resulting prefix tree retains
precisely the nodes (patterns) of interest, and eliminates
all non-branching nodes.
Then we place a set of hierarchical Pitman-Yor
processes to approximate the probability vectors in
prefix tree [18]. Specifically, each predictive distribution
is modeled as a Pitman-Yor process as follows:
(3.2) G[u]|du, cu, G[pi(u)] ∼ PY (du, cu, G[pi(u)])
where du and cu represents the discount and strength
parameters of the Pitman-Yor process. G[pi(u)] denotes
Figure 2: An example to build marginalized prefix tree
on sequence ABCBC. The marginalized edges are
marked in red
the prior distribution of G[u]. The prior distribution is
also a Pitman-Yor process with respect to the suffix of
u, pi(u). The suffix consists of all but the earliest word
in u. This choice of the prior structure reflects our belief
that among all preceding alerts, those appearing closer
to the current alert are more important in capturing the
dependencies with the current alert.
To learn the parameters in this model, Gibbs sam-
pling can be used.
3.1.2 Alerts Patterns Searching We are also in-
terested in finding alert patterns corresponding to the
abnormal scenarios by their temporal dependencies. In
practice, it can be time consuming to search for the
possible alert patterns in a sequence, in particular con-
sidering long-term dependencies. To solve the problem,
we propose to use the breadth-first search algorithm to
travel over the prefix tree in order to find alert patterns,
and use the joint distribution in Equation 3.1 to mea-
sure the dependency within each alert pattern. Using
the conditional probability predicted by the hierarchical
Bayesian model, the temporal dependency of each alert
pattern can be further expressed as:
(3.3) p(u1:L) =
L∏
i=1
G[u1:i−1](si)
The stronger temporal dependency a pattern has, the
more likely that alerts inside this pattern collectively
point to the system or user’s abnormal behaviors. Since
the length of the pattern can grow very large as the
height of prefix tree increases, we use a parameter Lmax
to control the maximal length of patterns. Meanwhile,
the minimal length of patterns is set at 3 since real
abnormal scenarios typically have more than two steps
to be accomplished. Therefore, we obtain a set of
alert patterns and their degree of dependencies from
the temporal model, denoted as U = {(u, pu)|3 6 |u| 6
Lmax}
3.2 Content Dependency Modeling In addition
to temporal information, an alert also contains rich con-
tent information. It consists of heterogeneous categori-
cal entities — such as host, system, agent, source, and
destination. In this section, we explore the content de-
pendency of these low-level entities within each alert.
The content similarity among a series of alerts
may provide hints of grouping them into the same
high-level anomalies. For example, consider an attack
in a computer system deleting a directory that con-
tains two files: “/home/document/password.txt” and
“/home/document/info.txt”. This attack will gen-
erate two alerts which share the same source (i.e.,
the process “rm”) and destination (i.e., the folder
“/home/document/ ”). And yet another deletion over
“/home/user/info.txt” will not be covered. Apparently,
compared to the third alert, the first two are quite close
in terms of the content.
How to measure the content similarity between
alerts via their entities? Every alert consists of a set
of entities. Their co-occurrence in one alert is one of
the most commonly considered connections [1, 17]. The
co-occurrence may exist within the same type of entities,
e.g., a process forks another process in a computer
system. It can also happen between different types of
entities, e.g., a process reads a file. However, entities —
as the categorical attributes of an alert — do not have
any intrinsic ordering among themselves, making most
popular numerical learning algorithms hard to directly
leverage their co-occurrences [22].
Recent advances in distributed text representation
learning have afforded effective text embedding meth-
ods that capture syntactic and semantic word relation-
ships. Mikolov et al. developed an unsupervised ap-
proach of learning word embeddings by exploiting word
co-occurrences in a corpus [13]. Inspired by their break-
through, we embed all entities into a common latent
space where the co-occurrences between entities are pre-
served. Then, the closeness between entities can be eas-
ily calculated in the space by popular metrics such as
Euclidean distances and cosine similarity.
In concrete, given an alert a = (v1, v2, . . . , vm, t), we
model the entity co-occurrences in a by the conditional
probability p(vi|vj ; θ) for each pair of categorical entities
in a, using the following Softmax function:
(3.4)
∏
vi,vj∈a
p(vi|vj ; θ) =
∏
vi,vj∈a
exp(wvivj · zvi · zvj )∑
v′
i
∈V exp(wvivj · zv′i · zvj )
where zvi and zvi are the embedding vectors for vi and
vj respectively, and V is the set of all available entities.
wvivj is the weight for pairwise interaction between vi’s
and vj ’s entity types, and it is non-negative constrained.
The parameters θ are zvi and wvivj for each vi ∈ V .
Given all the observed alerts {a1, . . . , aT }, we would
like to set the parameters such that Equation 3.4 is max-
imized. This optimization model has been historically
known very expensive to solve, due to the denominator
of Equation 3.4 summing over all entities of V . Thus,
we follow the existing idea of negative sampling to ad-
dress this challenge. In general, to avoid dealing with
too many entities in V , we only update a sample of
them. We surely should keep all observed co-occurred
entities in our data, and we need to artificially sample
a few “noisy entity pairs” — they are not supposed to
co-occur so their content similarities should be low.
In the end, after taking the logarithm and negative
sampling, we aim to minimize the following objective:
minv,w −
∑
(vi,vj)∈D
log(wvivjσ(zvi · zvj ))(3.5)
−
∑
(v′
i
,v′
j
)∈D′ log(wv′iv′jσ(−zv′i · zv′j ))
where σ is the sigmoid function, and D is the collection
of entity co-occurrences observed in our data. D′ is the
set of negative samples constructed by certain sampling
scheme. Concretely, for each co-occurrence (vi, vj) ∈ D,
we sample k noises (v′i1 , vj), (v
′
i2
, vj), ..., (v
′
ik
, vj) where
v′i is drawn according to a noise distribution. Without
a rule of thumb on guiding negative sampling, we
empirically test several and find the best one when
sampling vi in a probability inversely proportional to the
frequency of co-occurrence with vj . Then, the standard
mini-batch gradient descent algorithm is used to solve
the Equation 3.5.
Next, given the learned embedding vector of each
entity, we measure the pairwise alert similarity via
the weighted combination of cosine similarities be-
tween their entities. Suppose we have two alerts ai =
(vi1 , vi2 , . . . , vim) and aj = (vj1 , vj2 , . . . , vjm). Their
content similarity, denoted by Sij , can be calculated as:
Sij =
∑
vik∈ai,vjk∈aj
wvik ,vjk 〈zvik , zvjk 〉
where zvik and zvjk are embedding vectors of entities vik
and vjk , respectively, and wvikvjk is the learned weight
between the two entity types of vik and vjk .
3.3 Collaborative Alerts Ranking In this section,
we propose a ranking algorithm that simultaneously
computes the confidence scores for both individual
alert and extracted alert patterns, by maximizing their
consensus in terms of both temporal structures and
content dependencies.
Suppose we are given a sequence of alerts ai,
i = 1, . . . , T , whose confidence scores are denoted by
τi’s. The pairwise similarities between alerts, as re-
flected by their content information, is denoted by a
similarity matrix S ∈ RT×T . On the other hand, we
also extract L alert patterns, ul, l = 1, . . . , L based on
the temporal model, whose confidence scores are de-
noted µl’s. Note that for each alert pattern ul, we have
a number of alerts associated with it, whose strength
of temporal dependency is given as pl provided by the
temporal model. The relation between T alerts and L
alert patterns are represented by a zero/one coincidence
matrix F ∈ RT×L. Each element Fil = 1 indicates that
alert ai is linked to alert pattern ul.
Our goal is to simultaneously compute the alerts’
confidence τi’s and alert-patterns’ confidence µl’s, given
the alerts’ similarity S, confidence matrix F , and the
temporal dependency strength within patterns, pl’s. We
have the following requirements to impose in the rank-
ing process that maximizes the consensus between tem-
poral and content dependencies: 1) Those alert patterns
with higher degrees of temporal dependency strength,
pl, are more likely to be true positives; namely those
alert patterns composed of temporally correlated alerts
are more relevant patterns; 2) The confidence score of
each alert pattern should be close to the (average) con-
fidence scores of the individual alerts associated with it;
3) Alerts with similar content information tend to have
similar confidence scores. Given these considerations,
we propose the following optimization problem
minτ,µ−
∑
l plµl +
λ1
2
∑
i,l Fil(µl − τi)
2
+λ22
∑
i,j Sij(τi − τj)
2
s.t.
∑
i τi 6 K, µl > 0, 0 6 τi 6 1.(3.6)
Here, the first term in the objective function is used
to correlate µl’s to pl’s (requirement-1). The third
term is used to enforcement the smoothness of τi’s
based on the content-level similarity S (requirement-
3). These two terms independently impose constraints
on the alert-patterns’ confidence and alerts’ confidence.
They are connected with each other by the second
term in the objective, which states that the alert-
pattern’s confidence µl should be bounded close to those
individual alerts’ confidence τi’s associated with the
pattern. By doing this, each alert and alert-pattern will
be given a confidence score based on a global ranking
that reaches the consensus as specified by the temporal
structures and content similarities. The confidence
scores are non-negative, and K is a pre-defined integer
that roughly controls the number of alerts with non-zero
scores.
We further write the optimization problem in Equa-
tion 3.6 in a matrix form. Define diagonal matrices
DFc ∈ R
L×L and DFr ∈ R
T×T whose diagonal en-
tries are DFc(l, l) = λ1
∑
i Fil, DFr (i, i) = λ1
∑
l Fil.
Let LS be the Laplacian matrix of S. Let x =
[τ1, . . . , τT , µ1, . . . , µL]
T ∈ R(T+L)×1, then the optimiza-
tion problem in Equation 3.6 can be simply written as
minx q
Tx+ 12x
TQx
s.t. Ax 6 b, x > 0(3.7)
where q = [0, p1, . . . , pL] ∈ R
1×(T+L),
Q = [
λ1DFr+λ2LS −λ1F
−λ1F λ1DFc
] ∈ R(T+L)×(T+L),
A = [ IT×T 0L×L
11×T 01×L
] ∈ R(T+1)×(T+L), b = [1, . . . , 1,K]T ∈
R
(T+1)×1. This is a standard quadratic programming
problem with global optimal solution.
4 Experiments
4.1 Experiment Setup We apply CAR to a real-
world enterprise intrusion detection system. The alert
data was generated by 10 intrusion detectors that
monitored both host-level and network-level events on
173 machines. In total, there are 3, 322 alerts collected
within one month. Among them, there are only 41 true
positive alerts corresponding to three different types of
attacks.
Each alert is a computer system event recording an
interaction between a pair of system entities. The types
of system entities involve processes, files, and Internet
sockets (INETSockets). Three types of interactions are
considered in this experiment including: (1) a process
accesses a file; (2) a process forks another process;
(3) a process forks an INETSocket. Each alert is
also associated with a set of descriptive, categorical
attributes and the time stamp.
We implement CAR in Java and run it on a PC
with a 2.5GHz CPU and 8GB RAM. By default, we
set the maximum alert pattern length Lmax = 7, and
pre-defined integer K = 50.
Attack Description. Our attack testbed is built by
professional Russian hackers. There are 3 different types
of attacks with 5, 6 and 7 attack steps, respectively. For
each type of attacks, the hackers tried 3 times in three
different days, which resulted in a total of 9 intrusion
attacks in the data. The three types of attacks are listed
in the following:
• Emulating Enterprise Environment (EEE): This
attack consists of seven steps. The hacker first
utilizes the IRC vulnerability to create telnet pro-
cesses and reverse connect to attacker host. The
telnet process is used to create malware binary
and open reverse connection. The malware pro-
cess downloads malware binary (trojan.exe). Then
the trojan.exe is created and used to connect back
to attacker host. DLL is injected by running pro-
cess notepad.exe and creates connection back to the
hacker. The hacker uses mimikatz and kiwi to per-
form memory operation inside meterpreter context.
Finally, malwares PwDump7.exe and wce.exe are
copied and run on the target host.
• Diversifying Attack Vectors (DAV): There are six
steps in this attack. The hacker first writes mali-
cous php file by http connection, then downloads
the malware process (trojan.exe), and connects
back to attacker host. The process notepad.exe is
run to perform DLL injection. Attacker further
uses mimikatz and kiwi to perform memory oper-
ation inside meterpreter context. Finally, it copies
and runs PwDump7.exe and wce.exe on target host.
• Domain Controller Penetration (DCP): This at-
tack includes five steps to penetrate domain con-
troller. First, hacker sends email message with
a malicious word document, and the document
writes malware python32.exe, which opens up con-
nection to the attacker host. The hacker then runs
notepad.exe and performs reflective DLL injection
to gain privilege. He/she further transfers password
enumerator and runs process gsecdump-v2b5.exe to
get all user credentials. Finally, SQL server address
is probed to connect and dump database into the
attacker host.
Baseline Models. We compare CAR with the follow-
ing state-of-the-art methods:
• NGRAM [2]: This method has been widely used for
the identification of attacks and malicious software.
It builds the profiles of normal alerts from the
training data, and labels those alerts in the testing
data that do not appear in the normal profiles as
abnormal ones. In our experiments, we use the first
40% normal alerts as the training set for NGRAM.
• iBOAT [4]: This association rule based method
has shown its effectiveness in temporal structure
discovery [4]. It defines the true positive alerts as
those whose corresponding temporal patterns have
low confidence score.
• Embedding: This is our proposed method (see
Section 3.2) to learn the pairwise content-level
similarities between alerts. We use values in the
dominant eigenvectors of similarity matrices to
determine the anomaly degree of each alert.
• SimRank [7]: SimRank is a widely used graph-
based model to measure the similarities between
categorical data. It aggregates entities into a graph
and measures the pairwise similarities by applying
random walk algorithm. Based on the similarity
matrix, we use the same way as in Embedding to
measure the anomaly degree of each alert.
Evaluation Metrics. Since most methods listed
above produce abnormal scores instead of binary labels,
metrics for binary labels such as accuracy are not
suitable for measuring the performance. We adopt ROC
curves (Receiver Operating Characteristic curves) and
PRC (Precision Recall curves) for evaluation. Both
curves reflect the quality of predicted scores according
to their true labels at different threshold levels. To get a
quantitative measurements, the AUC (area under curve)
of both ROC and PRC are computed.
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Figure 3: ROC and PRC curves of different alerts
ranking methods
4.2 Results for Detecting True Positive Alerts
The ROC and PRC curves presented in Fig. 3. demon-
strate the effectiveness of proposed method in detecting
true positive alerts. As shown in the ROC curve, CAR
is able to detect most of the true positive alerts when
the false positive rate is controlled at a low level. The
advantage of the proposed method is further quantified
by the AUC values summarized in Table 1. In the PRC
curve, due to the effect of 2 (out of 41) true positives
ranked relatively low by the proposed method, the pre-
cision will diminish to near 0 when all true positives
are required to be detected. In addition, precision rates
of the baseline methods keep in low levels because these
models can only filter out up to 50% false positive alerts
in their best cases. It can also be observed that: embed-
ding the categorical entities into latent space better cap-
tures the similarities between alerts, as demonstrated by
the improved ROC and AUC of Embedding method over
SimRank method; the NGRAM model achieves better
accuracy compared to the other baseline models by us-
ing labeled training data; the iBOAT method does not
perform well because it is not suited for capturing the
long-term dependency.
In practice, it is unrealistic to provide accurate
estimations of the length of alert patterns, neither the
number of true positive alerts. Thus, we evaluate the
effect of these parameters on the model performance.
We vary the maximum pattern length Lmax from 4
to 7 and set the pre-defined integer K at 1, 10, 50,
and 100. The ROC curves are plotted in Fig. 4
Table 1: AUC of different alerts ranking methods
Method CAR Embedding SimRank NGRAM iBOAT
ROC 0.998 0.353 0.258 0.440 0.140
PRC 0.728 0.003 0.003 0.440 0.140
and the AUC values are summarized in Table 2. We
observe that the pre-defined integer K doesn’t affect
the CAR performance, because it only controls the
sparsity of alert scores but not the ranking among top
alerts. Meanwhile, incorporating the longer patterns
will benefit the alerts ranking result as demonstrated
by the improvements of AUC when Lmax increases.
But the effect is quite negligible especially when Lmax5.
This is because the number of long alert patterns
corresponding to attack scenarios is quite small.
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Figure 4: ROC and PRC curves w.r.t. the maximum
pattern length Lmax and the pre-defined integer K
Table 3: High-ranked alert pattern related to attack
scenarios
CAR rank Alert pattern Temporal rank
1 EEE-5,EEE-5, EEE-7 1
2 EEE-1, EEE-2, EEE-3 2
3 EEE-4, EEE-5, EEE-7 3
4 DCP-2, DCP-3, DCP-4DCP-5 7
5 DAV-2, DAV-3, DAV-4, DAV-6 14
6 EEE-1, EEE-2, EEE-3, EEE-4 41
4.3 Attack Scenario Related Patterns To evalu-
ate the CAR method in terms of generating meaningful
alert patterns, we compare it with the Temporal model
Table 2: AUC w.r.t. different parameter settings
Parameter K = 50 Lmax=7
Value Lmax=4 Lmax=5 Lmax=6 Lmax=7 K=1 K=10 K=50 K=100
ROC 0.995 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.996 0.998 0.998 0.999
PRC 0.401 0.829 0.843 0.840 0.760 0.760 0.802 0.821
presented in Section 3.1. Table 3 lists the top six alert
patterns generated by CAR and compares their ranks
in the Temporal model. These six patterns are all highly
associated with the three types of attacks. We use the
attack name plus the corresponding step number to rep-
resent the alert in each pattern. For instance, the alert
EEE-5 in the first pattern represents the fifth step of
Emulating Enterprise Environment attack. Note that
there are two different alerts associated with the step 5
of EEE attack. Generally, Table 3 shows that by ex-
ploiting the content correlation between alerts, CAR
greatly boosts the rank of the attack-related patterns
in Temporal model. More specifically, four patterns are
detected for the EEE attack. The step 6 (the hacker
looks up domain controller admin credential cached on
memory) is not discovered, however, due to the lack
of memory monitoring detector in our intrusion detec-
tion system. A longer pattern that captures the whole
EEE attack scenario is also detected by CAR, with the
highest rank in patterns with lengths larger than 4, but
with a relatively low rank of 61 in all patterns. That is
because longer patterns tend to have lower correlation
scores. For the DAV attack, CAR successfully recon-
structed four steps, with only step 1 and 6 missed be-
cause no corresponding alerts were generated by the de-
tectors. For DCP attack, CAR also recovered four out
of five steps, where the first step was actually missed by
the raw detectors.
5 Related Work
5.1 Alert Post-processing Data mining techniques
have been widely used in alerts post-processing [20,
8, 14]. Based on the level of prior knowledge needed
for alerts post-processing, the models can be classified
into supervised learning models, which rely on the la-
beled training alerts, and unsupervised learning models,
which aim to detect unknown anomalies.
Alerts classification models proposed in [16, 10] use
classifiers to distinguish true alerts with false positives.
These methods can not capture alerts that are not
observed in the training phase. However, in practice
it is usually unrealistic to obtain plenty of training data
for anomaly detection tasks.
In order to compensate for the lack of prior knowl-
edge, alerts correlation models are developed to identify
the underlying anomalies. for example, clustering tech-
niques can group similar events together, which have
proven to be highly effective in reducing large number
of alerts produced for a single malicious activity [15].
Valdes and Hyvarinen proposed a probabilistic model
that measures the overall similarity between alerts as
a weighted combination of their similarities on the re-
spective attributes [20]. However, the specification of
weights relies on experts’ knowledge. Holmann and Sick
proposed an online intrusion alerts aggregation system
[6], which measures the similarity between alerts using
a finite mixture distribution. They characterized the
continuous and categorical attributes using multinormal
and multinomial distributions, respectively, and aggre-
gated alerts into groups by solving the finite mixture
distribution using EM algorithm. However, the effec-
tiveness of this method depends on the distribution as-
sumptions. A hierarchical clustering technique was pro-
posed by Julisch in [8] for grouping the alerts that share
common root causes. But the number of clusters need
to be predetermined. In addition, the main weakness
of clustering models is they do not exploit the temporal
dependency, such as the causality, between alerts.
5.2 Alert Pattern Discovery Alert pattern discov-
ery aims to reconstruct multi-step abnormal scenarios
(e.g., a cyber attack) by looking at the causality be-
tween alerts, which can be used to provide a high-level
view of the actual attack. Association rule mining is
used to investigate the multi-step alerts reconstruction
in [11]. Frequent sequence patterns are mined over alert
bursts and abnormal scenario models are constructed
based on pattern matching and correlativity calculation.
However, the risk of missing relevant alerts and the ef-
fects of alert latency are not considered in this work.
Machine learning methods such as n-gram analysis [5],
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [21], and Bayesian net-
work (BN) [14] are commonly used to reconstruct com-
plex scenarios by training the models under known ab-
normal scenarios or true positive alerts. However, the
effectiveness of these methods relies on the prior knowl-
edge to build the training data and the efficiency relies
on the data preprocessing to remove the false positives.
Different from the existing methods, CAR exhibits
desirable properties that an alerts post-processing sys-
tem requires: it is (1) unsupervised: no training data
is required and no class labels need to be provided;
(2) data-driven: no prior knowledge is needed for pre-
processing data or defining abnormal patterns; and (3)
unified framework: CAR discovers the top-k alerts
and the corresponding alert patterns simultaneously, by
modeling both temporal and content dependencies be-
tween alerts.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed an important and challeng-
ing problem of alerts post-processing on massive hetero-
geneous categorical alert data. We proposed CAR, an
unsupervised data-driven collaborative alerts ranking
algorithm for detecting the trustworthy alerts and their
associated abnormal patterns simultaneously. When
tested on three enterprise cyber attack scenarios, CAR
demonstrated the superiority in terms of various skill
and robustness metrics, including 55 − 85% AUC im-
provement as well as interpretability of detected alert
patterns. An interesting direction for further explo-
ration would be incorporating raw event data with the
alert data in abnormal scenario reconstruction.
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